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MUSLIMS AND ACCESSIBLE
JURISPRUDENCE IN LIBERAL
DEMOCRACIES: A RESPONSE TO

EDWARD B. FOLEY'S
JURISPRUDENCE AND THEOLOGY
Khaled Abou El Fadl*
DWARD Foley asks whether religion is ever relevant to a lawyer's work. In answering this question, Foley argues that we must
consider the extent to which religion is relevant to the law itself. From
there, Foley deals with the role of a judge in adjudicating cases and
the extent to which, if at all, a judge may cite religious considerations
in reaching a decision. Foley asserts that a judge should not rely on
theological beliefs in adjudicating cases. Borrowing Rawls' concept of
overlapping consensus,' however, Foley argues that under certain circumstances a judge may cite an overlapping consensus of different
theological beliefs in support of her judgment. A lawyer, likewise,
may not invoke religious reasons but, under certain circumstances, can
argue the existence of an overlapping consensus to a court.
I agree with Foley's basic argument. A judge should not rely on
religious beliefs in adjudicating cases and should not cite religious reasons in justifying her decisions. Furthermore, I agree that a lawyer
should base her arguments on an analysis of the law rather than religious considerations.' It is important, however, to differentiate between the various players and spokespersons in a legal system and the
extent to which each may rely on or cite religious reasons in a legal
system. It is necessary to distinguish between the roles played by legislators, executives, judges, and lawyers in a legal system and the extent to which each of these role players may cite or base their
decisions on religious justifications.3
Generally speaking, however, public officials in a liberal democracy
should rely on arguments or reasons that are open or accessible to
E
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1. See John Rawls, Political Liberalism (1993).
2. The question as to whether a judge or lawyer should inject religious beliefs
into the legal process is a separate issue from whether religion is relevant to the law
itself. In other words, even if judges or lawyers should not rely on religious beliefs in
deciding or arguing cases, this is a separate issue from whether theology is relevant to
jurisprudence or whether theology and jurisprudence could benefit from each other.
On the benefits of a discourse between law and theology, Joseph Vining has written
two excellent works: From Newton's Sleep (1995), and The Authoritativeand the Authoritarian(1986).
3. See Kent Greenawalt, Private Consciences and Public Reasons 141-64 (1995);
see also Kent Greenawalt, Religious Convictions and Political Choice (1988) (distinguishing between the amount of self-restraint that a citizen, legislator, executive, or
judge should exercise in invoking religious reasons in support of their activities).
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most citizens. Religious reasons or justifications are not accessible or
open to most citizens and, hence, tend to exclude and discriminate
against those who do not share the religious convictions cited. This is
so whether the public official is a legislator or executive and especially
when the public official is a judge.
The appearance of fairness and impartiality is crucial in adjudicatory situations. A judicial decision citing Judeo-Christian values, for
example, or quoting the teachings of Buddha, is not persuasive to a
Muslim and, in fact, is inherently alienating to a Muslim.4 This is especially the case if the decision citing non-Muslim religious sources
was decided against the Muslim litigant. If a non-Muslim judge refers
to her religious convictions in deciding a case against a Muslim, by
definition, the judge has cited reasoning or justification that is not accessible or open to discussion or refutation by the Muslim litigant. If a
judge, for instance, cites Christian values in support of a ruling against
a Muslim litigant, the Muslim litigant might be placed in the untenable
position of having to convince the judge that Muslim values are worthier than the values cited by the judge,5 an inherently problematic
situation. I believe, however, that it is particularly troubling within
the context of the Islamic tradition. There is a strong tradition in Islam emphasizing the need to live and organize life pursuant to the
Divine Will and Command and according to Islamic values and laws.
But Islam also has a strong tradition emphasizing the values of accessibility and reciprocity.
Devout Muslims are ordered to obey God and conduct themselves
according to God's commands. The Qur'an6 states: "And those who
do not judge by God's revelations are unjust."7 Elsewhere, the
Qur'an commands Muslims to obey God and the Prophet Muhammad.' Muslims are to search for the Divine Will and implement God's
laws ("Shari'a").9 At the same time, however, Jews and Christians are
4. See Khaled Abou El Fadl, Muslim Minorities and Self-Restraint in LiberalDemocracies, 29 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 1525 (1996) [hereinafter El Fadl, Muslim Minorities].
5. Even if the judge refers to his or her religious beliefs in dictum not directly
relevant to the adjudication of a case, this is still problematic. If the cited dictum
invokes terminology or symbolism inconsistent with the Muslim litigant's religious
beliefs, this has an alienating effect on the Muslim litigant. Furthermore, there is the
appearance of impropriety and suspicion of possible bias. The losing Muslim litigant
may, understandably, suspect that she lost the case for reasons unrelated to the legal
merits of the litigation.
6. The holy book of Islam. Muslims believe God revealed the Qur'an to the
Prophet Muhammad through the Angel Gabriel.
7. Qur'an 5:45. All translations of the Qur'an in this Essay are to A. Yusef Ali,
The Holy Qur'an: Translation and Commentary (1977). In some passages I have altered the translation to reflect my understanding of the original.
8. Qur'an 3:132. Muslims believe that the Prophet Muhammad is the last
prophet in a long line of prophets that include Ibrahim, Moses, Jesus, and others.
9. Shari'a literally means "the way." Islamic law is often somewhat inaccurately
called Shari'a. See Joseph Schacht, An Introduction to Islamic Law 1 n.1 (1964) (defining Shari'a as "the sacred law"); El Fadl, Muslim Minorities,supra note 4, at 1525-
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commanded to govern themselves by their respective revelations as
well. 10 The Qur'an states: "To each of you We have given a law and a
way and a pattern of life. If God had pleased, God could have made
you one people (professing one faith)."" At least in theory, Islamic
theology accepted differences in religious convictions and beliefs as
natural and acceptable. Even more, it was accepted that certain religious minorities in an Islamic state would be able to retain their courts
and laws.' Although historical practice was not always at par with
theory, the fact remains that the idea that people should be bound by
their own religious laws was affirmed in principle. While Muslims
should govern themselves by the laws revealed to them, non-Muslims
should implement their own laws.
The basic principle affirmed here is one of reciprocity and accessibility. If Muslims are to live by their own religious laws, so must nonMuslims be allowed the same privilege. This is why, for example, a
number of Muslim jurists demanded that Muslims be able to retain
their own laws in non-Muslim lands. These jurists expected a degree
of reciprocity-because non-Muslims were permitted to retain their
own laws in Muslim lands, the reciprocal relationship would be expected in non-Muslim lands. 13 Other Muslim jurists argued that the
public laws of Shari'a have no application in non-Muslim lands. Muslims living in non-Muslim territory are bound by the public laws of the
territory in which they reside. As long as these Muslims are allowed
to practice their religion privately and are not forced to obey the religious laws of the host state, these Muslims may continue to reside in
the non-Muslim territory even if the public laws of Shari'a are
suspended. 4
Beyond the dynamics between Muslims and non-Muslims, the internal dynamics of Islamic law affirm the principle of accessibility. There
is no formal church in Islam. Furthermore, no single institution can
26. Shari'a is an all encompassing term that means the way of Islam. The positive
laws of Islam are called fiqh.
10. Qur'an 5:43, 5:47.
11. 1d. 5:48.
12. See Choucri Cardahi, Conflict of Law, in Law in the Middle East 335-37

(Majid Khadduri & Herbert J. Liebesny eds., 1955); NJ. Coulson, A History of Islamic Law 27 (1964); Rodolphe J.A. De Seife, The Shar'ia: An Introduction to the
Law of Islam 70-71 (1993). Criminal and commercial laws were often considered public laws applicable to Muslims and non-Muslims alike. Christians and Jews retained
their own personal laws.
13. See Bernard Lewis, Legal and HistoricalReflections on the Position of Muslim
PopulationsUnder Non-Muslim Rule, in Islam and the West 43, 53-55 (1993); El Fadl,
Muslim Minorities, supra note 4, at 1533.

14. The position that the public law of Shari'a is suspended in non-Muslim territory belongs particularly to the Hanafi school of law in Islam. See Khaled Abou El
FadI, Islamic Law and Muslim Minorities: The Juristic Discourse on Muslim Minori-

ties from the Second/Eighth to the Eleventh/Seventeenth Centuries, 1 Islamic L & Soc'y
141, 172-81 (1994); Khaled Abou El Fadl, Legal Debates on Muslim Minorities, 22 J.
Religious Ethics 127, 146-51 (1994).

1230

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66

define the correct view in Islamic law. Islamic historical practice has
produced several equally orthodox Islamic schools of law. In the contemporary age, many of these schools have become extinct and only a
few survived.' 5 A Muslim has the right to adopt the school of law that
he or she finds most persuasive. 16 Because each of the schools is considered equally orthodox, at times this led to the state setting up several parallel court systems with each court system following a specific
school.' 7 Litigants could choose the court system that followed a
school of law consistent with their own beliefs. Furthermore, in the
Islamic tradition there is an established practice in which a jurist suspends her own convictions or jurisprudential school in order to apply
a law more accessible to the litigants. This became particularly relevant when the jurist belonged to a minority school or adopted a minority view in the law. In this case, the jurist would rule according to
the majority view or pursuant to the position adopted by the school of
law followed by the majority of the population.' 8
In short, the idea that the law should be accessible and non-exclusive finds strong support in the Islamic tradition. But in order for the
law to be equally accessible either the state must allow each religious
group to retain its own laws or it must take a neutral position in relation to all religions. If Muslims are not to attempt to force their own
religious views upon others, they are entitled to expect the same from
non-Muslims.
In a liberal democracy we must differentiate between political or
legal views that are accessible and non-exclusive, and comprehensive
views which are non-accessible and exclusive. Religious views, by
their very nature, are non-accessible and exclusive. Whatever the
merits or demerits of invoking religious arguments in the political process, the judiciary must maintain an absolute appearance of fairness
and impartiality. In order to do so the judiciary must be able to explain its decisions in non-exclusive and accessible terms to everyone
who comes before itj. 9
This brings me to Foley's argument that in certain circumstances the
judiciary may invoke an overlapping consensus of religious views on a
certain point. I think this argument is problematic. The concern here
is that only the views of the popular or powerful would be integrated
in this consensus. For example, the views of the Jewish or Christian
traditions might be considered and integrated in this overlapping consensus while the traditions of the unpopular or disempowered may be
15. There are four surviving Sunni schools of law: Hanafi, Hanbali, Shafi'i, and
Maliki. There are three surviving Shi'i schools of law: Ja'fari, Zaydi, and Isma'ili.
16. Instructive on this point is Jalal al-Din al-Suyuti, Ikhtilaf al-Madhahib (1983).
Note that for the purposes of this Essay, the FordhamLaw Review is relying upon the
author's personal translation of the foregoing work.
17. See Sherman Jackson, Islamic Law and the State 52-53 (1996).
18. El Fadl, Muslim Minorities, supra note 4, at 1539-40.
19. Id. at 1540.
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misrepresented or excluded. A judge might either assume that the
views of the minority religions are consistent with her own or reconstruct the views of such religions to fit within the overlapping consensus. In other words, a judge of Christian background might be
convinced that Jewish and Christian views support what she believes
to be an overlapping consensus. The judge might know very little
about the Islamic tradition. It is quite conceivable that the judge
would assume that the Islamic tradition supports the overlapping consensus or might reconstruct or interpret the Islamic tradition so that it
would fit within the consensus.
I do believe a judge can and should bring her own sense of decency
and conscience to bear upon the cases she adjudicates. A judge
should integrate a sense of right and wrong into her work as long as
she can explain her decision in accessible and non-exclusive terms. If
a judge is deeply religious, it is not realistic nor even advisable to ask
that she develop a split personality when she performs her job. But if
the judge is unable to translate her sense of right or wrong into accessible and non-exclusive terms then, by definition, her decision is exclusive, discriminatory, and unjust. For a devout Muslim there is no
greater injustice than to feel that while the public laws of Shari'a are
suspended, she must follow the laws of a different religion.

Notes & Observations

